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ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF CONCLUSIONS
IN THE WHITE BOOK REGARDING THREATS
AND CHALLENGES IN EU COMMON SECURITY
AND DEFENCE POLICY
Among the many issues that were presented in the White Book on National Security
of the Republic of Poland (Bia³a, 2013; Bezpieczeñstwo, 2013),1 there were also those
related to the functioning of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Among
other things, theWhite Book pointed to the significance of CSDP for Polish security and
the need for EU Member States to broaden their collaboration in security and defence.
In addition, the key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were underscored and
some of their causes highlighted. The aim of this brief study is to present the factors re-
sponsible for weakening the effectiveness of CSDP as outlined in the White Book and
consequently, their systematisation and extrapolation in the context of broader re-
search.
The White Book underscores that Poland’s strategic work in respect to security should
be based on three priorities. The first, maintenance of a determination and readiness to act
in various spheres and fields of national security. The second, strengthening of international
security community through a deepening of collaboration in respect to Euro-Atlantic mat-
ters, especially in the context of NATO, CSDP and strategic partners (to name but USA).
The last priority, relates to the select participation of Poland in the international arena in re-
spect to early prevention of threats and their origins, as well as the solution of already exist-
ing crises; a policy realised on the basis of an international mandate.
CSDP: EU CHALLENGES AND THREATS
In relation to Poland’s engagement in the initiative currently being realised in the
context of CSDP, the authors of the White Book indicated several of the most important
challenges and problems being faced by the EU in respect to a Common Security and
Defence Policy.2 In their view they are as follows:
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1 Bia³a Ksiêga Bezpieczeñstwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Biuro Bezpieczeñstwa
Narodowego [National Security Bureau], Warszawa 2013. This publication contains the research for
2010–2012 in respect to the Strategicznego Przegl¹du Bezpieczeñstwa Narodowego (National Secu-
rity Strategic Review, NSSR), including the NSSR Commission Report that set out key conclusions
and recommendations for Poland’s security policy.
2 The sequence of factors listed is of no importance, but purely a liberty the present author has taken.
– socio-economic issues such as the crisis in the Eurozone, fall in economic growth,
low level of self-sufficiency in raw materials, the growing crisis in demography, as
well as differences in living standards, income and access to goods and services of
particular EU Member States and their citizens;
– the need to create a coherent EU policy in regard to Russia;
– intensification of work by the EU in common with NATO, mainly for the purposes of
strengthening political coherence and increasing effectiveness of initiatives taken
such as international operation security;
– the functioning of the 2003 European Security strategy (mostly no longer current),
which is increasingly less applied to contemporary demands of the security environ-
ment. As a result, 2012 work on the European Global Strategy was undertaken,
which is to result in the creation of a new EU security strategy (Bia³a, 2013: 160)3;
– changes arising in the context of the European Union that are related to enlargement
and deepening of integrating processes (Lisbon Treaty). These are responsible for the
need to redefine aims, tasks and priorities of EU security policy;
– the political will of EU Member States in respect to “the development of institutions,
building of skills and active EU operational engagement in its neighbourhood”
(Bia³a, 2013: 124). The development of European military capabilities shall serve
such matters as initiatives of pooling, adaptation of the EU Battlegroup concept to
the current demands of the immediate environment (for example through increasing
the opportunities for their use), establishment of a permanent command-planning EU
structure and broadening of collaboration with Eastern Partnership states;
– existential issues, amongothers, such as limitedmutual trust betweenEUMemberStates;
– the need to furnish integration processes (also in security and defence) with a func-
tional character, clearly underlining the fact that they have to meet the needs and in-
terests of Member States;
– acceleration of the building of structures and procedures tied to CSDP, the European
External Action Service, and in this regard to redefine common interests and strategic
aims of EU Member States, as well as indicating the means of their realisation;
– the strengthening of EU profile as a strategic actor actively working on the interna-
tional arena;
– comprehensive analysis of the fast-growing changes occurring among EU neigh-
bours (the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe), as well as the evolution of
the global power jigsaw taking place, which is related to among others, the world fi-
nancial crisis and politics of so-called rising world-powers.
CSDP: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE EU
In summarising this part of the discussion one ought to emphasise that justifiably,
the White Book highlighted the three most important issues from Poland’s point of view
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3 For more discussion on this see the seminar on European Security Novelisation and Strategic
Review of EU Security, Biuro Bezpieczeñstwa Narodowego [National Security Bureau], 28 February
2011, http://www.bbn.gov.pl (28.12.2013).
in the common interest of EU Member States as far as CSDP is concerned (ibidem:
160). The first is the relative strength of EU security potential, including defence poten-
tial so as to meet the challenge of occurring and prognosed threats. The second is as-
sessing the capability for individual protection (particular citizens), as well as
protection of the collective (society) from various types of threats to their life and
health. Finally, it is important to guarantee a safe environment for the development of
the social and economic potential of Member States, as well as an optimum exploitation
of this potential for the support of actions in the field of security.
In addition, it should be noted that the EU ought to conduct an active policy of “us-
ing opportunities and preventative reduction of threats, which is tied to the need to
conduct international military and civil security operations” (ibidem: 160–161), as
well as the maintenance of a state of readiness in terms of policy decision mecha-
nisms, planning and training for the purposes of an effective response to real or poten-
tial threats. This is strongly tied, firstly, to the creation of mechanisms for joint
operations between the EU and NATO and secondly, reform of planning systems and
EU operational command.
One of the possible scenarios for the modernisation of CSDP is the formation of
a so-called “European command (vanguard) in the field of security”, which could in-
crease the effectiveness of joint action in the sphere of security and defence of the EU,
strengthen civic and military capabilities in the sphere of crisis response and moderni-
sation, and broaden partnerships of any industry on the part of defending EU Member
States. In this context Poland should actively take part in initiatives of this type, which
could take the form of collaboration in the context of the Weimar Triangle.
CSDP: CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS ACCORDING
TO THE WHITE BOOK
The challenges and problems relating to CSDP indicated in the White Book can be
divided into three basic categories:
1) internal causes related to the situation occurring in the context of the EU (for exam-
ple, limited mutual trust on the part of Member States or the need to accelerate the
construction of further CSDP structures and procedures);
2) external causes resulting from a situation in the international arena (for example, the
intensification of activities conducted by the EU jointly with NATO and the number
and escalation of new so-called hot spots occurring in various parts of the globe that
impact on EU policy);
3) compound causes, where factors attributed to the above 2 come to overlap or combi-
ne (for example, a financial crisis that has both global and European implications).
Internal causes
The catalogue of issues in the joint security and defence policy for the EU presented
in the White Book, is of a general nature and demands significant broadening. Among
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the factors attributed to the first category (internal causes related to the EU) one ought
to take into consideration also the following:
– the conflict over ‘leadership in the EU, as well as the growing crisis surrounding it. In
future, should the role of EU leader be one tied to a single state, or perhaps several? If
so, then in what configuration and on what terms and in what context? Is the concept
of ‘a hard core ‘or ‘two speeds’ still relevant – or perhaps there is some form of dual-
ism in referring to the concept of two EU budgets (one for the Eurozone and one other
Member States), as well as in the field of foreign policy and defence planning;
– the significance of Member State national interests (Grosse, 2010). This can be ob-
served, taking the example of the extent of the budget, for example a lack of
consultation or exchange of information between states on the planned or conducted
reduction of expenditure in the military sector. Another example is ‘the attachment’
of some states to their independence in the sphere of purchases or modernisation of
arms. This weakens not only EU potential but also its integrity;
– the dependence of EU institutions on the need to gain support from Member States.
In situations where there is a difference of position this can unduly extend or com-
pletely disable the decision making process. The large number of Member States and
the range of views or interests means that cases such as these are not rare (Koszel,
2008; Smith, 2008). A good illustration of this in the past was the position taken to-
wards conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Libya, the ballistic missile project
and at present, the EU position taken towards Syria, Afghanistan and Iran, or indeed
the future shape of the CSDP;
– the lack of serious debate on the position and role of the EU in the international
arena. A number of questions and dilemmas accompany this, ones relating to for
example the directions and concept of the further development of the EU, as well as
the means of resolving key problems. One example is the lack of a comprehensive
foreign policy strategy on the part of the EU (Ziêba, 2007) and the differences be-
tween Member States that appear in relation to such policy priorities, it’s means of
funding and realisation, among others. This situation, depending on the number
and complexity of issues, as well as the tempo of processes arising on the interna-
tional arena, accordingly weakens the position and image of the EU (Wojciuk,
2010; Su³ek, 2013);
– the state of ongoing EU crisis. At present it is possible not only to speak of a financial
or economic crisis, but indeed ‘a Europe of many crises’ (Rocznik, 2012: 49). Such
problems relate to among others, society, institutions, political leadership, legitimi-
sation etc – while at the same time embracing various sectors of integration, includ-
ing security and defence. Onto all of this, there is in addition overlaid the issue of an
EU of many cultures, escalation of radicalism and the strengthening of social move-
ments against EU integration;
– the tensions leading to a conflict of a political or competence nature occurring be-
tween particular EU institutions or states. This is demonstrated by discussion on the
subject of opening a permanent operational command (OHQ) initiated by the minis-
ters of France, Germany and Poland. The proposition has met, however, with opposi-
tion from Great Britain who hold that increasing the effectiveness of EU command
submissions should be realised not by creating new institutions, but by making exist-
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ing procedures more effective. This has resulted in a heated discussion among not
only Member States but also EU institutions (Rocznik, 2012: 253–255);
– the fall of interest in the question of security. The escalation of economic problems
and the lowering of perceived levels of threat (in the context of terrorism) has caused
that both among political elites, as well as public opinion, it is possible to observe
a lower interest in the sphere of security and defence. This is accompanied by a fall of
support for the idea of using military force or EU engagement in conflict situations;
– lack of comprehensive solutions regarding some aspects of the functioning of CSDP.
One illustration is the EU engagement in fighting piracy on the shores of Somalia.
The sea and air patrols conducted in the context of Operation Atlanta and the appro-
priate coordination of activities with NATO forces has turned out to be rather an ef-
fective instrument in removing piracy. It was not, however, possible to create
effective solutions that would lead to the elimination of causes of this problem or in-
deed the sources of piracy itself;
– the delay in the realisation of accepted programmes and plans, as well as clear signs
of stagnation in certain sectors of CSDP. Agood example of this are the several-year
delays relating to the Galileo navigation system, problems tied to the functioning of
Battlegroups and deregulation of the arms market (Terlikowski, 2011; Galileo,
2013). All this corresponds to the lengthy nature of many decision-making pro-
cesses. These are extended, among others, as a result of ‘unending’ consultations
between particular states or organs, or as a result of complex procedures of a admin-
istrative and/or legal nature (the long process of forming many EU missions). This
lowers effectiveness to a significant degree, and consequently the credibility of the
EU, as well as its policies. An apt illustration of this was the belated reaction of the
EU to the bloodletting and political crisis that arose in Ukraine at the beginning of
2014;
– obstacles of a strictly bureaucratic nature. These reflect the case of difficulties related
to the realisation of a so-called civic operational aim and insufficient number of local
experts. Though this was recognised formally by Member States, such obstacles of
administrative and legal nature made their resolution difficult;
– the human factor; in some Member States there is a lack of appropriately trained per-
sonnel, especially in relation to activity in the international arena. Moreover, there
are instances of corruption or a lack of professionalism among the political elites, as
well as officials in public institutions.
External causes
Analysing, however, the external causes of CSDP weakness indicated by the White
Book, one needs to in addition, also highlight the great extent of threats occurring on the
international stage, which directly or indirectly have an impact on the general issue of
EU security and defence. Threats as such possess both a geographic (hot spots such as
Iran, Syria, Somalia and North Korea) and subject-specific dimension (terrorism, fun-
damentalism, separatism, conventional arms, arms of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts
and finally, failed states) (Booth 2008; Security, 2008; Contemporary, 2010;
Analysis and assessment of conclusions in the White Book regarding threats... 35
Europejska, 2009). The list of these threats in both cases is subject to constant modifi-
cation and change, which further complicates the planning and administration of
CSDP.
Of importance also is the impending decrease of USA military engagement in Eu-
rope. In the context of present American defence strategies the issue of European de-
fence is being taken over in importance by other regions such as Asia and the Pacific,
and the Middle East. This is in line with decisions relating to a decrease of expenditure
(487 billion dollars) for 2012–2021 by the US Department of Defence – and a further
reduction is also possible in years to come. The 2011 Budget Control Act has plans put
into place whereby a lack of agreement in respect to a reduction of the deficit to 1.2 bil-
lion dollars by 2021, the American budget shall be reduced by a further 500 billion dol-
lars (Daggett, 2012; NATO’s, 2012). This in turn means that the EU has to take over
from the USAa part of the relevant defence tasks and correspondingly, accept a greater
participation in costs, such as the functioning of NATO. The scale of financial dispro-
portion between the USA and EU in terms of funding designated for military expenses
is shown in the table below.
Table 1
Comparison of military expenditure: US and UE per capita for 2010–2011 in euro
2010 2011 % change
EU US EU US EU US
Total _0length194 billion _0length520 billion _0length193 billion _0length503 billion –0.5% –3.3%
As % of GDP 1.69% 4.77% 1.55% 4.66% –3.4% –2.2%
As % of Total Government 3.2% 11.23% 3.17% 11.18% –0.9% –0.4%
Per Capita _0length390 _0length1,676 _0length387 _0length1,610 –0.7% –3.9%
* Asignificant part of this percentage change is due to exchange rate variations. If instead of values in euros, values
in dollars were used, the percentage change of the US total defence expenditure between 2010 and 2011 would be
+1.5% and that of the defence expenditure per capita would be +0.9%.
Source: EU-US Defence Data 2011 (2013), European Defence Agency, Brussels.
The intensification of activity on the international stage by entities such as Russia
and China is also becoming noticeable. This relates to various aspects of activity such
as economic, military in the context of geo-politics and finally, espionage, which in turn
forces the EU to take counter measures and consequently, the allocation of further re-
sources and finances.
Compound causes
In respect to the third group, relating to compound causes (both external and internal
factors combined) raised in the White Book, more focus ought to be devoted to such is-
sues as the above mentioned variety of challenges that the EU is facing, as well as the
high pace of change arising across the globe that necessitates EU engagement in many
parts and as a consequence, the so-called dilution of available finances. One illustration
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in this context are civilian missions realised in the framework of CSDP (Misje, 2010;
CSDP 2013; Dobrowolska-Polak, 2009; Rocznik, 2013: 236), and for example:
EULEX – Kosovo, EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) – Georgia, EU Border Assis-
tance Mission (EUBAM) – Moldova/Ukraine, EUJUST Lex – Iraq, EU Border Assis-
tance Mission (EUBAM) – Palestine National Authority, EUPOL – Afghanistan,
EUPOL – Democratic Republic of Congo, EUCAP Sahel – Niger, EUAVSEC – Sudan
South., as well as EUTM – Mali (Przybylska, 2008: 133).
CSDP Destabilising factors
One key determinant responsible for the weakening at present of CSDP action is the
financial crisis (Ma³kiewicz, 2010; Kryzys, 2011) that has both a global, as well as
strictly European dimension (mainly EU). In the case of the EU this has resulted in,
among others, the slowing of the economy, rise of unemployment and fall in budget
revenues. This in turn has directly translated into a reduction of funding for the defence
sector, including a fall of expenditure on modernisation and long-term research and de-
velopment programmes. In total, in the past three years, defence expenditure for EU
Member States has decreased by about US$45 billion (Valasek, 2011).
As a source of CSDPweakness it is possible to see also another factor recognised as
a positive aspect in its functioning, namely one of the fundamental regulations deter-
mining that EU action on the international arena has to be in accord with the United Na-
tions Charter – that is the decisions of the Security Council. From a legal point of this is
absolutely correct, but from a strategic one, however, this principle can limit EU effec-
tiveness in for example, the resolution of conflicts.
Another important challenge in this context are relations are rising in the geo-po-
litical triangle of EU-NATO-USA. An analysis of foreign policy in this respect for the
EU and its respective Member States, shows not only a difference of conception and/or
particular interest, but also of particular consequence in respect to CSDP such as the
fears of some Member States of EU militarisation and a ‘conflict-of-interest’ with
NATO (Natkañski, 2004; Turczyñski, 2012; Demkowicz, 2007; Tavares, 2010; Soja
2011; McCormick 2011). One example here is the assessment of the situation in Af-
ghanistan or Syria, the question of ballistic missile defence and many other related is-
sues (Kiwerska, 2013; Partners, 2013).
One should also note the phenomenon of ‘two speeds’ taking place both in the con-
text of NATO and CSDP, with various degrees of engagement being shown by partic-
ular Member States in its functioning. This in effect has been raised by general
secretary of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who stated that European members at
present only are responsible for 20% of defence expenditure of NATO states, which
carries with it a variety of consequences. In his view the most important are as follows
(Szef, 2011):
– the EU is losing the ability (capability) to take part in international crisis operations,
which results from the limiting of military capabilities such as air force, reconnais-
sance or logistics. One of the latest cases in point was the operation in Libya where
the EU needed support from the US;
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– a low share of defence expenditure will lead to a fall in the importance of the EU on
the international stage. This particular geopolitical hiatus can be filled by other en-
tities such as China, India or Brazil. As a result the USAcan place greater emphasis
on relations with the preceding at the expense of EU, thus weakening transatlantic
relations;
– this state of affairs can in addition, strengthen the pressure of American public opinion
– increasingly opposed to paying out of their own taxes – to fund European security.
* * *
It can be argued that the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland
(WBNSRP) justifiably advances such questions tied to the problems and challenges re-
lating to a Common Security and Defence Policy for the EU. The research presented on
account of its research nature has, however, it can be said a rather general formula and
therefore should be viewed rather as an introduction to further debate on related issues.
The list of so-called problems relating to CSDPas related in the White Book needs to
be broadened, among others in terms of the factors outlined and then given a framework
according to clearly defined criteria. One such possible solution is the division pre-
sented in the text embracing three main groups of precipitating factors: internal related
to the situation in the context of EU, external arising out of the situation on the interna-
tional stage and lastly, factors arising out of a combination of elements in the previous
two categories.
The main causes responsible for the challenges and threats occurring in the context
of CSDP, also underscored in the White Book, should be seen among several varied fac-
tors. In particular, the following determinants deserve to be distinguished: differences
of positions and interests of Member States, financial problems (budget cuts) and the
economic crisis in the EU, lack of a decided political mindset in relation to reforms and
renewed collaboration in the sector analysed, as well as mechanisms described as Three
Wise Monkeys whereby a ‘selective’view is taken as far as recognition of a common en-
emy is concerned…
This particular ‘selective view’ ‘expired’ together with the end of the Cold War, and
later again together with the ‘fading’of fears relating to threats from fundamentalist Is-
lamic terrorism (Jackson, 2011; Wojciechowski, 2013), exemplified among others by
the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid or London. Such a point of view should, how-
ever, be reformulated on account of the threats relating to failed states, fundamentalism,
terrorism, mass migration and major bloodlettings, exemplified by the situation in
Ukraine at the beginning of 2014. This it can be said, is essential from the point of view
of the EU, as well as its particular Member States.
Further reforms in the context of CSDPwill significantly impact not only on the se-
curity of Poland or other Member States, as well as all of the EU. The head of the Na-
tional Security office Stanis³aw Koziej emphasised this during a conference on new EU
security strategies, held in Warsaw, October 2012. He went on to maintain that a new
security strategy should be established, one that takes into account national interests
and after establishing EU Member State mutual interests, one that clarifies relations
arising on the EU-NATO horizon. This ought to be conducted into two stages. The first,
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a strategic review of national security of every Member State based on a definition of its
interests as strategic objectives. The second stage would embrace a review of the secu-
rity of all the EU, with the aim of defining common interests lying at the basis of a new
strategy (Koziej, 2012).
Increasing the effectiveness of CSDP is a very difficult task indeed. This is exempli-
fied by for example, the conclusion to the European Council summit (19–20 December
2013) relating to a common security and defence policy. The above summarises a de-
cade of work on the part of the European commission and EU Member States on further
CSDP reform. Among others, the following were pointed out: the so-called impotence
of the EU in this particular field, differences in security priorities of respective Member
States, budgetary limitations, fragmentation of European arms markets and finally, dif-
ficulties in negotiating common positions on these and related matters.
As a consequence, further initiatives in the context of CSDP are only advanced by
a relatively small ‘coalition of eager beavers’, which may result in the future in a differ-
entiation of EU integration level as far as defence and security is concerned for particu-
lar Member States. So as to counteract this the European Council has established three
priority actions such as increasing operational effectiveness, ‘visibility’ and strength of
CSDP impact, growth of EU defence capabilities and strengthening of the European de-
fence sector. The European Council in particular emphasised the means of their realisa-
tion and forecast another assessment, which is to be conducted in June 2015.
It is to be hoped that the planned actions will not only be realised but also contribute
to the strengthening of CSDP, as well as at least to some extent, the limitation of chal-
lenges and problems arising in this sphere as indicated among others, in the White Book
on National Security of the Republic of Poland.
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ABSTRACT
Among the many issues that were raised in the White Book on National Security of the Re-
public of Poland (WBNSRP), there were also those related to the functioning of a Common Se-
curity and Defence Policy (CSDP). Its importance for the security of Poland was indicated, as
well as the need on the part of EU Member States to broaden collaboration in the sphere of secu-
rity and defence. The key problems occurring in the context of CSDP were also emphasised and
their causes indicated. The aim of the article is to present the factors responsible for the weaken-
ing of CSDP effectiveness, ones taken into account in the White Book, and subsequently to pres-
ent a Framework for their analysis in the light of further scholarship.
ANALIZA I OCENA WNIOSKÓW ZAWARTYCH W BIA£EJ KSIÊDZE
BEZPIECZEÑSTWA NARODOWEGO RP DOTYCZ¥CYCH WYZWAÑ
I ZAGRO¯EÑ DLA WPBiO UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ
STRESZCZENIE
Wœród wielu kwestii, które zosta³y prezentowane w Bia³ej Ksiêdze Bezpieczeñstwa Narodo-
wego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej poruszono tak¿e zagadnienia zwi¹zane z funkcjonowaniem
Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeñstwa i Obrony (WPBiO). Wskazano m.in. na znaczenie WPBiO
dla bezpieczeñstwa Polski czy koniecznoœæ rozszerzenia przez pañstwa cz³onkowskie Unii Eu-
ropejskiej wspó³pracy w sferze bezpieczeñstwa i obrony. Podkreœlono równie¿ kluczowe pro-
blemy wystêpuj¹ce w obrêbie WPBiO oraz zasygnalizowano niektóre ich przyczyny. Celem
artyku³u jest zaprezentowanie czynników os³abiaj¹cych efektywnoœæ WPBiO uwzglêdnionych
w Bia³ej Ksiêdze Bezpieczeñstwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, a nastêpnie ich usys-
tematyzowanie oraz ukazanie w œwietle szerszej analizy naukowej.
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